Sanctions, Disinvestment,
and U.S. Corporations in South Africa
By
Richard Knight
———–————————–————––––––––—––––—––——––––––—–—–—
Authors Note
This
chapter originally appeared in Sanctioning Apartheid (Africa
World Press), 1990. This book, edited by
Robert E. Edgar, has a number of useful chapters and can be ordered online at www.africanworld.com. Type the book title in the search field. The text here has been slightly edited and
corrected, including in the number of states, counties and cities that had
taken economic action against apartheid by the end of 1989 and targeted banks
(including withdrawal of deposits and divestment) by the end of 1985. Such counts are rough as the structure of
legislation and action varied widely.
South Africa is now a democracy and no
longer the target for sanctions and disinvestment. The sanctions mentioned in this chapter,
including those at the federal, state, county and city level, have all been
lifted. Some of the companies mentioned
as divesting here have returned to do business in a democratic South Africa. — Richard Knight, April
2001
[Back to
Bibliography]
[Home to
richardknight.com]
———–————————–————––––––––—––––—––——––––––—–—–—
Future historians may date mid-1984 as a turning
point in the history of South Africa. Massive protests inside South Africa combined with escalating
pressure internationally to force substantial capital flight and perhaps the
greatest challenge to the continuation of white minority rule in recent
history. In the five years since then,
some 200 U.S. and more than 60 British companies have withdrawn from South
Africa, international lenders have cut off Pretoria's access to foreign
capital, and the value of the rand, South Africa's currency, has dropped
dramatically. South Africa's economic relations with
the international community have been significantly altered.
This chapter will attempt to discuss the effects of
sanctions and disinvestment over the last five years and highlight some of the
continuing U.S. financial links to South Africa. Finally, I will attempt to draw some
conclusions as to the effectiveness of international attempts to pressure the
white minority government through sanctions and disinvestment.[1]
The
Political Context
Undoubtedly the greatest challenge to white minority
rule came from the explosion of political resistance which followed Pretoria's introduction of a new
constitution in 1983 with a complex set of segregated parliaments. In a total rejection of apartheid, black
South Africans mobilized to make the townships ungovernable, black local
officials resigned in droves, and the government declared a State of Emergency in 1985 and used thousands
of troops to quell "unrest."
Television audiences throughout the world were to watch almost nightly
reports of massive resistance to apartheid, the growth of a democratic movement,
and the savage police and military response.
This escalation of popular resistance sparked a dramatic expansion of
international actions to isolate apartheid, actions that combined with the
internal situation to force dramatic changes in South Africa's international economic
relations. U.S. corporate executives, who
hoped that if they just held on for a few years apartheid would slowly
disappear, were forced to face the reality of a long drawn out
confrontation. The writing on the wall
spelled trouble ahead in South Africa and at home. As a result, the agenda of South Africa's new State President, F.
W. de Klerk, is dominated by efforts to counter the democratic movement and
international pressures.
The
U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement
In the U.S., the long established
movement to impose economic isolation on South Africa gathered dramatic momentum
in this period. Activists seeking to
stop corporate collaboration with apartheid found the way blocked in Washington and had developed other
strategies for exerting pressure on the corporations. One major focus of this effort was the
divestment campaign, aimed at moving individuals and institutions to sell their
holdings in companies doing business in South Africa. Already strong on the campuses across the U.S., new student protests
surged after 1984 and the number of colleges and universities at least
partially divesting jumped from 53 prior to April 1985 to 128 by February 1987
to 155 by August 1988.
The divestment movement was not limited to the
campuses. Concerned legislators and
anti-apartheid activists built strong networks in cities and states and by the
end of 1989 26 states, 22 counties and over 90 cities had taken some form of
binding economic action against companies doing business in South Africa. These activities include divestment by public
pension funds of stocks of companies doing business in South Africa and pressure exerted via
selective purchasing policies, whereby cities give preference in bidding on
contracts for goods and services to those companies who do not do business in South Africa.
All this local activity helped
generate the thrust for a victory in 1986 when passage of the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act was won over the veto of President Reagan. What made the Congressional override more
surprising is that it happened while the Republican Party controlled the
Senate. The Act banned new U.S. investment in South Africa, sales to the police and
military, and new bank loans, except for the purpose of trade. Specific measures against trade included the
prohibition of the import of agricultural goods, textiles, shellfish, steel,
iron, uranium and the products of state-owned corporations. The Act has had some effect in cutting U.S. imports from South Africa, which declined by 35% between
1985 and 1987. However, in 1988 U.S. imports from South Africa increased by 14% to $1.5
billion. U.S. exports to South Africa increased by 40% between
1985 and 1988. Some of the increase in U.S. imports may be due to lax
enforcement of the 1986 Act. A 1989
study by the General Accounting Office concluded that the US government had failed to
enforce the Act adequately. A major
weakness of the Act is that it does little to prohibit exports to South Africa, even in such areas as
computers and other capital goods.
In 1987, the Budget Reconciliation
Act included an amendment by Rep. Charles Rangel ending the ability of U.S. firms to claim tax credits
in the U.S. for taxes paid in South Africa. This effectively imposed double taxation on U.S. corporate operations in South Africa. The sums of money involved are large. According to the Internal Revenue Service,
taxes involved in 1982 were $211,593,000 on taxable income of $440,780,000. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce in South Africa has estimated that the measure
increases the tax bill for U.S. companies from 57.5% to 72%
of profits in South Africa.
|
Table 1
|
|
Trade with South Africa, 1985-1988 ($million)
|
|
Year
|
US Exports
|
US Imports
|
|
|
|
|
|
1985
|
1,205.0
|
2,070.8
|
|
1986
|
1,158.3
|
2,364.5
|
|
1987
|
1,281.2
|
1,345.5
|
|
1988
|
1,690.3
|
1,529.6
|
In August 1998 the House of
Representatives passed a new sanctions bill mandating the withdrawal of all U.S. companies from South Africa, the sale by U.S. residents of all
investments in South African companies and an end to most trade, except for the
import of certain strategic minerals.
The bill did not reach the Senate floor but the fact that such a
sweeping bill got as far as it did alerted both the South African government
and U.S. business that significant
further sanctions were likely to be forthcoming.
The impact of the anti-apartheid
movement has clearly been felt by US companies.
It has significantly raised the cost of doing business in South Africa, adversely affecting
corporate image, threatening the ability to raise capital and maintain domestic
markets. Gone are the days when, as in
1980, David Packard of Hewlett Packard stated, "I'd rather lose business
in Nebraska than with South Africa."
U.S. Investment
Some 200 U.S. companies have disinvested
from South Africa in the last five years and U.S. direct investment has
declined from $2.3 billion at the end of 1982 to $1.3 billion at the end of
1998. However, many of those companies
which have disinvested continue to do business through licensing, franchising,
and distribution agreements.
Despite the large number of
corporate withdrawals and the prohibition of new U.S. investment, which came in
effect in the fourth quarter of 1986, the value of U.S. direct investment in South Africa actually increased between
1985 and 1987. However, the basic trend
is down. A number of major disinvestment
took place in 1989, very likely bringing direct investment below $1 billion.[2]
|
Table 2
|
|
|
US direct investment in South Africa by type of industry
|
|
|
($ million)
|
|
|
End
|
All
|
Petroleum
|
Manu-
|
Whole
|
Banking
|
Finance
|
Services
|
Other
|
|
|
Year
|
Industries
|
|
facturing
|
Sale
|
|
and
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Trade
|
|
Insurance
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1982
|
2,281
|
S
|
998
|
295
|
S
|
46
|
18
|
S
|
|
|
1983
|
1,987
|
S
|
963
|
210
|
S
|
56
|
20
|
158
|
|
|
1984
|
1,440
|
S
|
777
|
79
|
S
|
53
|
21
|
162
|
|
|
1985
|
1,394
|
S
|
568
|
227
|
S
|
48
|
12
|
162
|
|
|
1986
|
1,567
|
S
|
633
|
291
|
S
|
61
|
26
|
139
|
|
|
1987
|
1,590
|
S
|
707
|
186
|
0
|
74
|
32
|
S
|
|
|
1988
|
1,270
|
S
|
508
|
80
|
0
|
69
|
S
|
S
|
|
|
Legend
|
|
|
S =
suppress. Direct investment is a
measure of the value of the foreign subsidiaries and associates of U.S. companies. Department of Commerce figures include only
those companies whose ownership goes directly from the US to South Africa.
Not included would be a company which has a subsidiary in a third
country, which in turn has a subsidiary in South Africa.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: U.S.
Department of Commerce
|
|
A
Vulnerable Economy.
Not only are U.S. corporations disinvesting,
but, as the accompanying table shows, those of many other countries as
well. Since mid-1984, South Africa has suffered considerable
capital flight, as a result of corporate disinvestment and because of the
repayment of foreign loans. Net capital
movement out of South Africa was R9.2 billion in 1985,
R6.1 billion in 1986, R3.1 billion in 1987 and R5.5 billion in 1988. This trend is continuing, with R1.7 billion
in capital outflow in the first two quarters of 1989. One effect of this capital outflow has been a
dramatic decline in the international exchange rate of the rand. This means that imports are increasingly expensive. It has also helped fuel South Africa's inflation rate, which at
12-15% per year, is much higher than its major trading partners.
The South Africa government has attempted to
limit the amount of capital outflow. In
September 1985 it imposed a system of exchange control and a debt repayments
standstill. Under exchange control,
South African residents are generally prohibited from removing capital from the
country and foreign investors can only remove investments via the financial
rand, which is traded at a 20% to 40% discount compared to the commercial rand. This means companies that disinvest get
significantly fewer dollars for the capital they withdraw.3
Few argue against the thesis that
the South African economy was developed with foreign capital. This was especially true of the gold mining
industry, which is central to the apartheid economy. Most South African economists agree that
without foreign capital, South Africa will not be able to fund
the necessary imports for economic growth at more than a marginal rate. This is because in order for the economy to
grow, South Africa must import capital goods
and other inputs for production.
Currently it has difficulty in paying for everything it wants to
do. The modest economic expansion in the
South African economy in the first half of 1988 put such a strain on the
current (trade) account, that in August 1988, Pretoria slapped a hefty surcharge
on capital goods imports. At the same
time, the government increased fuel prices by 15%, despite the fact that the
world price for petroleum has been dropping.
If South Africa had a net inflow on the
capital account (especially loans and investment), it would be able to fund the
necessary imports for economic growth.
|
Table 3
|
|
|
Cumulative disinvestment from South Africa and/or
|
|
|
Namibia, with number of corporations at end of 1987
|
|
|
|
Disinvestment
|
Divesting
|
Remaining
|
|
|
|
|
|
Number
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Australia
|
17
|
—
|
32
|
|
|
Canada
|
21
|
3
|
12
|
|
|
France
|
6
|
1
|
15
|
|
|
West Germany
|
10
|
—
|
128
|
|
|
Netherlands,
|
12
|
3
|
27
|
|
|
Norway, Sweden,
|
|
|
|
|
|
Denmark
|
|
|
|
|
|
Switzerland
|
2
|
—
|
32
|
|
|
UK
|
92
|
7
|
266
|
|
|
US
|
250
|
21
|
178
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total
|
410
|
35
|
690
|
|
|
Source: Business
International, based on UN Economic and Social Council E/1988/23, 8
February 1988. The figures in this table do
not match those cited in the text for several reasons, including that of time
period covered.
|
|
|
|
|
South Africa needs not only foreign
capital but also foreign technology. South Africa imports 95% of all computer
equipment, and could not build a car, truck, or other sophisticated item
without imported technology and components.
While some South Africans have talked of a "siege economy," in
reality South Africa is heavily dependent on
foreign input. The South African Board
of Trade and Industry notes that although import replacement has long been
government policy, merchandise imports as a percentage of gross domestic product
has only declined from 20% to 19% between 1960 and 1986. South Africa's economy is simply not
large enough to develop high-tech products.
Even the mining industry depends on capital goods imported from the U.S. and other countries. Henri de Villers,
chairman of the Standard Bank Investment Corp., put it succinctly. "In
this day and age there is no such thing as economic self-sufficiency and we
delude ourselves if we think different… South Africa needs the world. It needs markets, it needs skills, it needs
technology and above all it needs capital."
A Way to Go
U.S. investment in South Africa is clearly not at an
end. More than 130 U.S. companies still have
subsidiaries in South Africa. And products of U.S. companies are available via
licensing, franchising, and distribution agreements. As a result, U.S. companies and their
products are found across the spectrum in South Africa. Supermarkets in South Africa often look like
supermarkets in the U.S. with Kellogg's cereals,
Colgate toothpaste, and Coca-Cola. South
African miners use continuous miners, drill bits and other equipment from such
companies as Joy Technologies, Baker Hughes, and Dresser Industries. The chemical products might well come from
American Cyanamid Co. or E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co.
Computers come from IBM and Hewlett-Packard. A person reading a magazine will see
advertisements designed by J. Walter Thompson.
Petroleum
Industry
Nowhere is the strategic nature of U.S. investment in South Africa more clearly shown than in
the oil industry. That remains the case
today, although several U.S. companies, including Mobil,
have disinvested. For many years the
largest U.S investors in South Africa were Mobil and Caltex (a
joint venture of Chevron and Texaco). In
1995, U.S. petroleum companies
(primarily Mobil and Caltex) had a net income after taxes of $75 million,
approximately one-half of all U.S. non-bank affiliates in South Africa.
Caltex Petroleum Corp., the U.S. parent of the Caltex group
of companies, is 50% owned by Chevron Corp. and 50% owned by Texaco Inc. Up-to-date information on Caltex is difficult
to come by as the company is extremely secretive about its operations in South Africa. Caltex is estimated to have $350 million in
assets in South Africa, and is reported to service
1,185 filling stations, of which some 393 are company owned. These filling
stations give Caltex a 20% share of the South African market. In 1980 Caltex Oil (SA) (Pty.) Ltd. had 2,257
employees or 17% of Caltex's employees
worldwide. Caltex operates a 100,000
barrel per day refinery, which represented about 6.3% of the company's
world-wide capacity in 1980. Caltex owns
34% of South African Oil Refinery (Pty.) Ltd., a 3,000 barrels per day lube oil
refinery.
The U.S. presence in the South
African oil industry would be much larger if it were not for the effort of the
antiapartheid movement. Ashland Oil sold
all its South African operations in mid-1986.
For a short time, Ashland had maintained licensing
and distribution agreements, including the sale of $300,000 a year in Valvoline
products. However, when faced with the
possible loss of a $12 million contract with the City of Los Angeles, Ashland quickly terminated its ties
to South Africa. "Our relationship with Los Angeles was clearly more important
than our small and somewhat limited relationship with South Africa," said Ashland corporate attorney John
Biehl.
In 1989, Mobil Corp., which had over
$400 million in assets in South Africa, disinvested. Because of its strategic involvement, Mobil has
been one of the foremost targets of the anti-apartheid movement. Mobil has also headed the corporate efforts
to oppose sanctions and disinvestment.
Mobil's disinvestment is a major victory for the U.S. anti-apartheid activists.
U.S. oil companies have claimed
in the past that they were not responsible for the actual importation of oil
into South Africa, which is done by the
government, but they did refine and market petroleum. The U.S. companies, combined with
the UK company British Petroleum
and the UK/Netherlands company Royal Dutch/Shell, refined the vast majority of
petroleum used in South Africa.
U.S. oil companies have never
denied that they sell to the South African police and military. The get around the U.S. government restrictions
prohibiting sales to the police and military because the oil they sell is South Africa has not been exported or
reexported from the U.S. Justifying selling oil to the police and
military has not been a problem for U.S. oil companies. As recently as 1981, Mobil told its
shareholders: "Total denial of supplies to the police and military forces
of a host country is hardly consistent with an image of responsible citizenship
in that country. The great bulk of the
work of both police and military forces in every country, including South Africa, is for the benefit of all
inhabitants."
The oil companies have been out in front as
companies attempting to present an image of opposition to apartheid. Shell took out advertisements in the Weekly
Mail, an "alternative" newspaper in South Africa, saying it is for a free
press. Mobil had been one of the leading
companies behind the Sullivan Principals, and, after the abandonment of the
principals by the Reverend Sullivan, the principles' rebirth as the "Statement
of Principals."
Motor
Industry
South Africa's reliance of foreign
technology is clearly demonstrated in the motor industry. There is no such thing as a "South
African" car. Despite years of a
"local content" program, 40% to 50% of the value of input into cars
produced in South Africa is imported. Two of the largest U.S. investors, Ford and General
Motors, have withdrawn from South Africa but their products continue
to be made in South Africa under license. Ford vehicles have long been sold to the
police and military. In 1986, in its
last proxy statement before ending ownership in South Africa, Ford stated that if it
ceased sales to the police and military in South Africa, it would lose all
government sales and no longer be economically viable. Ford has made it clear that although it no
longer has any ownership, it is going to continue to provide not only the
design, but the management and retooling assistance, without which, Ford
maintains, the South African operations would likely not be able to continue.
General Motors (GM) had made a loss
in South Africa for several years prior to
its withdrawal. Now GM cars are made
under license by its former subsidiary renamed Delta Motor Corp., which now
also assembles Isuzu trucks.
Early in 1988, as international
pressure on companies doing business in South Africa continued to grow, the
Japanese company Toyota announced that it would
limit the number of cars made in South Africa. South African motor companies, recognizing
their own vulnerability and the danger of increasing pressure on their
suppliers, recently agreed to suppress sales data, the publication of which,
they said, was aiding advocates of sanctions.
"With sales rising, SA companies don't want to put more pressure on
their Japanese principles. Delta SA, for
instance, represents Isuzu's second biggest market outside Japan," observes the Financial
Mail.
Computers
All U.S. computer companies have
ended direct investment in South Africa, but almost all have
continued licensing and distribution agreements. U.S. mainframe computers
represent almost 50% of the market. South Africa is totally dependent on
imported computers and South African businessman display increasing concern
about the possibility of computer sanctions.
"Mainframe computers are only one of the items most vulnerable to
sanctions and this cannot be replaced by a locally manufactured product,"
noted one South African business executive recently. "This year we ware able to import
computers but who knows what the situation will be next year." Despite the U.S. ban on the sales of
computers to the police and military, sales are not prohibited to any of the
1,000 private sector companies which handle 60% of military production in South Africa.
Companies that no longer have
ownership in South Africa, but continue to do
business through distribution agreements include Amdahl Corp. (disinvested in
1987), Control Data Corp. (1988), Honeywell Inc. (1986), International Business
Machines (1986), and Unisys (1988).
International Business Machines
(IBM) sold its South African subsidiary in October 1986. The South African company was renamed
Information Services Management (ISM) with ownership vested in an employee
trust named ISM Trustees. By October
1987 ISM had formed a joint venture with a large South African conglomerate,
Barlow Rand, a company with close ties to the South African military. This new company is called Technology Systems
International (TSI). ISM Trustees and Barlow
Rand each own 28%, the remainder is publicly owned. TSI has two subsidiaries, ISM and Reunert
Computers, which had previously been a subsidiary of Barlow Rand. The one, Reunert Computers, sells
Japanese-made Hitachi IBM plug-compatible mainframe computers in apparent
competition with IBM computers sold by ISM.
This ISM-Barlow Rand marriage appears to have been designed to
circumvent sanctions. Brian Mehl,
managing director of ISM, commented, "What we've done with Technology
Systems International is create the best of all worlds for our customers in
that we've immediately created an alternative source — we've got IBM and we've
got the leading IBM-compatible supplier."
IBM products continue to play an
important role in the South African computer market. An estimated 40% of South Africa's installed mainframe
computer base is of IBM origin, and the company had a 1985 market share of 20%.
The terms of the Unisys
disinvestment demonstrate the concern South African companies have about being
cut off from the source of their supply.
In August 1988 Unisys sold its South African subsidiary to a local
company, Mercedes Datakor, for R132 million.
Mercedes Datakor, which will continue as the Unisys distributor,
insisted on some protections for itself from a possible future cutoff of Unisys
products. Unisys received only R82
million in cash immediately, the balance to be placed into a trust in Europe and paid to Unisys in
quarterly payments over four years, provided Unisys continues to supply the
South African company. In addition,
Mercedes Datakor demanded a ten-year distribution agreement, where the normal
Unisys agreement needs to be renewed annually.
Such a long-term agreement makes it more difficult for Unisys to
unilaterally stop supplying its products to the South African company.
The disinvestment of Control Data
Corp. in November 1988 was very similar to that of Unisys. Control Data sold to a South African
company. Only 60% of the purchase price
was paid immediately, the rest to be paid over five years, provided Control
Data continues to supply its former subsidiary.
Control Data cited U.S. law prohibiting the
financing of any expansion of its South African operations as the reason for
its disinvestment. Control Data retains
the right to re-enter South Africa if conditions warrant.
South Africa is dependent on the U.S. for computer software as
well as hardware. Most Japanese
mainframe computers sold in South Africa are IBM-compatible and run
IBM or other U.S. software. Software from most major producers is
distributed in South Africa. The software they produce is central to the
running of a modern economy. In March
1987, ISM became the sole South African distributor for Hogan Systems, a U.S. company that specializes in
software for banks. Since Hogan runs on
IBM mainframe computers, the use of Hogan by these banks helps hardware
sales. For example, Volkskas, which uses
Hogan, recently purchased R60 million worth of hardware from ISM.
This continued availability of
software raises some interesting questions about the implementation of
corporate decisions to distance themselves from apartheid. Microsoft, the maker of the computer
operating system MS-DOS and OS/2, announced in April 1986 that it had ended
"direct shipment of software to the Republic of South Africa and terminated its
relationship with its local distributor."
Yet clearly Microsoft products are available in South Africa, as without them no IBM or
IBM compatible personal computers could operate. Lotus Development Corp. has taken a stronger
position and considers the use and sale of its software products in South Africa a violation of copyright.4
Electronics
Westinghouse Electric Corp. closed
its South African office in 1987 but still has contracts with ESCOM for the
Koeberg nuclear power plant. In
addition, Westinghouse has several distributors and licensees in South Africa, primarily for electrical
equipment.
The Motorola case is another victory
for the anti-apartheid movement.
Motorola sold its South African operations to Allied Technologies
(Altech), a South African electronic company.
Motorola products are now made under license in South Africa, including its highly
regarded two-way radios. However, as a
result of pressure from municipal governments in the US, Motorola has announced
that it would not renew its licensing agreements with Altech when they expire
in 1990.
Sounding
a Confused Retreat
It is impossible in this chapter to
look at each of the corporate withdrawals.
In general, where a manufacturing corporation with plant in place
withdraws, the company sells its South African subsidiary either to local
management or to a South African company.
In these cases actual disinvestment does take place and capital leaves South Africa, but in most cases the
product remains through licensing and distribution agreements. In some cases no actual disinvestment has
taken place. A number of companies have
simply sold their all or part of their South African operations to European or
other U.S. companies, frequently as
part of a corporate restructuring.
In seems that the basic trend of US companies disinvesting from
South Africa will continue. And as the number of companies declines, it
will be increasingly difficult for those who remain to justify their continued
presence in South Africa. Some companies will sever all ties. However, it is also true that many of those
who withdraw from South Africa will continue to do
business through non-equity ties. This
continued collaboration with the apartheid economy will be a focus of the US anti-apartheid movement.
Bank
Loans
South Africa's foreign debt increased
significantly in rand terms between 1983 and 1985, although the increase in
dollar terms was less dramatic. By the
end of 1984 U.S. bank loans had reached $4.7 billion, about 20% of South Africa's foreign debt.
But as anti-apartheid pressure in
the U.S. grew, an increasing number
of U.S. banks modified their
lending policies, some prohibiting loans to the South African government,
others stopping all loans to South Africa. By the end of 1985, fourteen states, eleven
counties, and over 60 cities has adopted policies either withdrawing funds or
limiting other business with banks making loans to South Africa. The pressure to deny future loans was not
taken seriously at that time by the South African government, but it made a
major impact on the thinking of U.S. banks. Banks were also concerned about the South
African economy and by the rapid rise in South Africa's debt. Real gross domestic fixed investment had been
declining since 1982. The structure of
the South African debt was particularly disturbing. Debt with a maturity of less than one year
jumped from 56% in 1982 to 68% in 1985 to 82% in 1986. South African banks were borrowing money
internationally with short-term maturity and loaning it out as long-term loans
in South Africa, on the assumption that the
loans would be automatically rolled over as they matured.
|
Table 4
|
|
Foreign Debt of South Africa
|
|
End Year
|
Rand (million)
|
Dollar (million)
|
|
1982
|
24,289
|
22,609
|
|
1983
|
29,116
|
23,945
|
|
1984
|
48,230
|
24,294
|
|
1985
|
60,142
|
23,473
|
|
1986
|
49,513
|
22,593
|
|
1987
|
43,593
|
22,618
|
|
1988
|
50,380
|
21,185
|
|
Source:
South African Reserve Bank
|
In December 1984, Seafirst adopted a
policy of no new loans to South Africa, followed by the Bank of
Boston in March 1985 and First Bank System, also in 1985. Even more significantly, in July 1985, North
Carolina National Bank Corp., the regional bank with the largest lending to South Africa and the only regional bank
to have an office in South Africa, ended all new loans. It appears that many other banks, while not
acting publicly, limited their loans in this period.
The rapid rise in U.S. bank loans to
South Africa came to an abrupt halt in
mid-1985. Between March and September
1985, U.S. bank loans to South Africa declined by $757
million. In August 1985, Chase Manhattan
quietly told its customers in South Africa it would not roll over
loans. Most U.S. banks which had not already
ended new loans to South Africa quickly followed Chase's
action.
|
Table 5
|
|
US bank loans to South Africa
|
|
|
|
|
|
End Year
|
$ millions
|
Percent of South
|
|
|
|
Africa's Total Debt
|
|
1982
|
3,676
|
16.3
|
|
1983
|
4,637
|
19.4
|
|
1984
|
4,704
|
19.4
|
|
1985
|
3,240
|
13.8
|
|
1986
|
2,957
|
13.1
|
|
1987
|
2,888
|
12.5
|
|
1988
|
2,510
|
11.8
|
|
Source:
Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council
|
The U.S. banks' actions caused a
panic in South Africa. At the time, U.S. banks had outstanding loans
of $3.5 billion, of which $2.8 billion had a maturity of one year or less. Faced by the prospect of massive capital
flight, the South African government stepped in, and in September 1985, it
imposed a debt standstill and reimposed exchange controls.
Two "Interim Arrangements"
— the second one expires in June 1990 — were negotiated between the South
African government and a "Technical Committee" of fifteen
international banks, representing some 300 banks. The U.S. representatives on the
Technical Committee were Citicorp, Manufacturers Hanover, and J.P. Morgan.
The exact terms of the two interim
arrangements are not known. According to
press reports, the Second Arrangement lasted for about three years, during
which only 13 percent of the capital was repaid. Citicorp told The Africa Fund in early 1989
that it had received only about 5% of its principal back.5
Despite the fact that anti-apartheid
activists put pressure on banks to use the debt arrangements to put pressure on
the South African government to push ahead with reforms, a Third Interim
Arrangement was announced in October 1989 that effectively reschedules $8
billion of South Africa's foreign debt inside the
standstill. The new arrangement runs
from 1 July 1990 to 1 January 1993. During that
period, South Africa will have to pay foreign
banks approximately 20% — or $1.5 billion — of the debt inside the
standstill. By 1994, a fourth agreement
will have to be reached for the repayment of the remaining $6.5 billion.
South Africa's problem is that it owes
about $12 billion outside the standstill, some $2 billion of which is due in
1990. The debt repayment schedule under
the Third Interim Arrangement is aimed at limiting the amount of debt inside
the standstill that needs to be paid during this key period. Chris Stals, chairman of the South African
Reserve Bank, commented: "I am relieved we no longer face a crisis in June
1990, but this does not mean there is less pressure on the balance of payments. We will meet our new commitments as we did
the previous ones — with difficulty.
Economic policy will have to remain restrictive, especially considering
the large payments of debt outside the net falling due next year."
In order to get this new agreement, South Africa had to work hard. F. W. de Klerk released eight long-term
political prisoners, including Walter Sisulu, in October 1989. The U.S. government advocated
"giving F. W. a chance" and a grace period of at least six
months. But the Mass Democratic Movement
in South Africa issued a strong call for
financial sanctions and for no debt rescheduling and Walter Sisulu condemned
the new agreement.
It should be noted, however, that South Africa did not get everything its
way. Despite the fact that the dollar
figure of the money covered by the standstill has dropped from $12 billion to
$8 billion, it will be paying back slightly more than during the last
agreement. In fact, 20% of outstanding
capital will be paid back during the coming 3 1/2 year period compared to 13%
during the last three year period.
Combined with payment of debt outside the standstill, South Africa will be faced with
considerable capital outflow. Minister
of Finance Barend de Plessis admitted, "All South Africans must realize
that the country faces tough times in the next four years in which we have to
pay back $8 billion in foreign debt."
He also said that South Africa would have to adopt strict
internal policies to limit growth of the economy.
Exit
Loans
The new agreement also has a
provision whereby banks can remove their debt from the standstill by converting
their debt to long-term loans. Under
this provision, banks will get no principal payments for 7 1/2 years and then
will be paid back in equal six monthly payments over the following 2 1/2
years. A similar clause existing in the
Second Interim Arrangement was exercised by Citicorp. South Africa is encouraging banks to
take this option as it eases the immediate payment problems. Chris Stals remarked: "We already faced
substantial liabilities up to 1997 and it was prudent to avoid more pressure
during this period. The repayment of
these loans will be bunched in three years beginning in 1998."
It is difficult to determine how
many banks have exercised this clause, but U.S. bank loans with a maturity of
over five years have increased from $36 million in March 1987 to $747 million
in June 1989. This implies that at least
$710 million has been converted under the Second Interim Arrangement to
long-term loans.
Citicorp and Manufacturers Hanover
are two prominent banks which have converted some of their outstanding
loans. In February 1989, Citicorp
exercised one of the exit clauses by converting $660 million in short-term loans
covered by the Second Interim Arrangement into a ten-year loan. Citicorp will receive no repayment of
principal until 1992, with full repayment payment by 1997. Citicorp was criticized for this action
because it removed immediate pressure on South Africa at a time when it was
facing serious capital outflows. To
protest Citicorp's action, Westchester County, New York, withdrew $40 million from
Citicorp.
Maintaining pressure on banks that
continue to collaborate with South Africa is also the objective of a
bill which Congressman Walter Fauntroy (D-Washington, D.C.) introduced in the
House of Representatives shortly before the announcement of the Third Interim
Arrangement. If enacted, the bill would
impose a series of financial sanction against South Africa. It would require U.S. banks to insist that
"not less than 20 percent of the principal" on loans be paid back
each year; prohibit converting loans to long-term exit loans under the exit
clauses and holding of loans after 31 December 1992; and ban trade financing.
It is clearly very important for South Africa to keep its connections to
major banks of all its major trade partners.
South Africa continues to be able to get
trade credits and have other links with international banks. South Africa has been able to raise some
$600 million in bank loans backed by gold reserves held by the South African
Reserve Bank. In early October 1988 the
State President P. W. Botha used the opportunity presented by the funeral of
West German leader Franz Josef Strauss to visit Europe and meet with Swiss bankers
and businessmen. In late October the Johannesburg city council announced that
it expected to secure a $19 million loan.
Anti-apartheid activists are keenly aware that foreign banks will make
loans to South Africa if they seem profitable and
if they do not face anti-apartheid pressure.
Portfolio
Investment
U.S. investment in South African
companies listed on the South African stock exchange is over $14 billion. W. I. Car, the London stockbroker, estimates that
about 25% of South African gold mining shares, worth about $2.5 billion, are
owned by U.S. citizens. Davis Borkkum Hare, a Johannesburg
stockbroker, estimates U.S. ownership in all South African mining shares (not
just gold) at 14%, worth R14.3 billion ($4.1 billion).
This stock is owned in a number of
different ways. A number of gold and
other mutual funds own stock in South African gold mines. In this case, investors buy shares in the U.S. mutual fund, that then
invests in South African gold shares.
Two such mutual funds are International Investors and the Franklin Gold
Fund with some $300 million and $69 million respectively, invested in South
African gold shares. One company, ASA
Ltd., owned some $998 million in South African stock, primarily gold mines, in
August 1987. Unlike a mutual fund, U.S. investors buy ASA on the U.S. stock market. Stock in many South African companies South
African companies is also available through American Depository Receipts
(ADRs). ADRs are receipts issued by a U.S. depository bank to promote
trading in a foreign security. The bank
holds the foreign securities and the ADRs are issued against them. Dealers in ADRs of South African companies
include Citicorp, Chemical Bank, Irving Trust, Morgan Guarantee Trust and the
Bank of New York.
The Anti-Apartheid Act's prohibition
on new investment in South Africa has been interpreted to
mean that American residents cannot purchase South African stock issued after
the effective date of the Act. Stock
issued prior to that date can be can be bought and sold. The August 1988 bill passed by the U.S. House
of Representatives would mandate the sale of all this stock. The possibility of such sanctions has had a
depressing effect on South African gold shares.
Notes W. I. Car, "the threat of further U.S. disinvestment has made
South African gold shares unacceptable to the international
investor." If Americans were forced
to sell this stock, it would have a significant downward pressure on gold
stocks, and limit the ability of the gold mines to raise much needed capital.
Conclusion
South Africa has a continuing need for
foreign capital. Without new foreign
capital, in terms of loans and investment, South Africa's economy cannot grow at
more than a marginal rate. A few
examples are worth citing.
The gold mining industry has
historically been developed with foreign capital. With gold providing 40% of South African
exports, it is vital to the economy. Yet
South Africa's gold production declined
40% between 1970 and 1987. To even
maintain current production levels, South African mining companies will have to
invest large sums of money in exploration and new mines. When South African companies need to raise
money to finance new mines, they usually issue stock, much of which is purchased
overseas. Already U.S. citizens are prohibited
from buying new stock and if such sanctions are extended, it would be difficult
to see how South Africa could afford to undertake
the necessary expenditure to develop new mines.
Prior to the imposition of the debt
standstill, South African state corporations, such as ARMSCOR (armaments),
ESKOM (electricity), SASOL (oil), and ISCOR (steel) all borrowed extensively
overseas. Many South African companies
also borrowed on the international market.
All have had to drastically revamp their capital expansion programs as a
result of being cut off from the foreign capital market. They now have to depend on the domestic
capital market.
Foreign technology is as important
to South Africa as foreign capital. The anti-apartheid movement has been less
successful in blocking technology than it has been in forcing companies to
withdraw. But South African businessmen
are increasingly concerned that they will be cut off from needed foreign
technology.
The development of the Mossel Bay gas field demonstrates the
link between foreign capital and technology.
At least 20% of Mossel Bay will be foreign sourced,
without which the development could not b e undertaken. Without the necessary trade finance, this key
foreign input cannot be purchased.
Unless South Africa abandons apartheid, the
logic of the situation is that there will be more sanctions in the future, not
less. Although the Bush administration
opposes addition sanctions, this does not mean that it will be in a position to
stop such legislation. While welcoming
the fact that the Republican Party maintained control of the White House, South
African Foreign Minister Pik Botha cautioned, "A Bush victory does not
mean that South Africa has escaped
sanctions."
South Africa's new President, F. W. de
Klerk, faces a serious contradiction in his effort to modernize apartheid. If he eases up and allows more political
activity, the world will once again see massive demonstrations against
so-called change that does not lead to a unitary democratic state. But if it does not ease up, no changes made
will have the slightest credibility either at home or abroad.
A combination of growing resistance
and capital flight has severely challenged the long-term survival of the
apartheid system. The withdrawal of numerous
U.S. and UK companies is a significant
victory for the anti-apartheid movement.
Yet many companies continue to operate in South Africa, either through direct
investment or thorough licensing, franchising, and distribution
agreements. Recent events have
demonstrated how vulnerable the South African government is to international
pressure. Now is the time to increase
that pressure until the end of apartheid and the installation of a unitary
democratic state.
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